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provided a protective statute for every agency as it has for the FAA.
The only solution is to either carve an exception to Bristol-Myers, as
the alternative rationale of Evans does, in effect, or to find a source
of protection outside the Act such as the "informant privilege."'' 2
III. HEARINGS
A. RIGHT TO A HEARING
The Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly' held that under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment a welfare recipient must
be afforded an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of bene-
fits, regardless of a statutory provision requiring a post-termination
"fair hearing."' 2 After an initial determination that the right-privilege
distinction 3 was not applicable to the receipt of welfare benefits, the
Court applied the traditional balancing test 4 to the cohipeting inter-
ests at stake.5 In striking a balance the Court enumerated the interests
on the one side as the fundamental necessity of such payments to the
eligible recipient, and the interests of the state in insuring the general
welfare of its citizens.' The opposing interests which favored termina-
129. This has been described as the Government's privilege to withhold the identity of
persons who furnish information of violations of laws, subject to judicial limitations dependent
upon the needs of the defendant. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59-60 (1957). See
Stewart & Ward, FTC Discovery: Depositions, the Freedom of Information Act and Confiden-
tial Informants, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 248, 258 (1968). See also Comment, An Informer's Tale:
Its Use in Judicial and Administrative Proceedings, 63 YALE L.J. 206 (1953).
1. 397 U.S. 254 (1970), noted in 49 J. tRB. L. 186 (1971); 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 422 (1971).
2. 397 U.S. at 259-60 & n.5.
3. See Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE
L.J. 1245 (1965); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). See generally Van
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV L.
Rv. 1439 (1968).
4. Justice Frankfurter first outlined the factors to be weighed in determining whether a
particular proceeding was unfair, emphasizing the need to balance "the hurt complained of and
good accomplished." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); accord, Cafeteria Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886
(1961); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
5. ". . .consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of
circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function
involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action."
Cafeteria Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). See also Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
6. 397 U.S. at 264-65.
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tion pending a final hearing were defined as the conservation of the
government's fiscal and administrative resources. The Court went on
to hold simply that "the interest of the eligible recipient in uninter-
rupted receipt of public assistance, coupled with the state's interest
that his payments not be erroneously terminated, clearly outweigh the
state's competing concern to prevent increases in fiscal and adminis-
trative burdens." 7
It is clear the Court in Goldberg reached its decision by applica-
tion of a simple balancing test, but it was not until 1971 in Bell v.
Burson" that the Court again illustrated the scope of the individual
interests which would be sufficient to overbalance administrative con-
siderations. Since the Goldberg decision lower courts have been trying
to define the parameters that will aid in determining which private
interests will be given due process protection in the form of required
hearings prior to administrative action. This section will examine
what weights the courts have been giving the various competing inter-
ests in applying the Goldberg balancing test and the extension made
in Bell.
As illustrated by two late 1970 cases,' the circuits agree that a
tenant in a federally assisted public housing project owned and oper-
ated by a local governmental housing authority is entitled by the due
process clause to a hearing before an eviction determination is admin-
istratively made. Although the New York Housing Authority's proce-
dure for terminating tenancies on the grounds of nondesirability and
breach of the rules and regulations met the Department of Housing
and Urban Development's standards,10 the Second Circuit in Escalera
v. New York Housing Authority" held that even if public housing
could be considered a privilege, 12 the private interest in continuing the
tenancy outweighed the government's desire for a summary proceed-
ing. As noted in Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority, 3 the private
7. Id. at 266.
8. 402 U.S. 535 (1971). See notes 20-27 infra and accompanying text.
9. Caulder v. Housing Auth., 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1970);
Escalera v. Housing Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 400 U.S. 853 (1970).
10. See 425 F.2d at 861. See generally Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
11. 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970).
12. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970); Snaidach v. Family Fin. Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969); Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963);
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 609 (5th Cir. 1964);
Van Alstyne, supra note 3, at 1451-54; Note, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions,
117 U. PA. L. Rev. 144 (1968).
13. 433 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1970).
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interest is also bolstered by a complementary government interest
which helps to offset the government fiscal interest in a speedy adjudi-
cation:
The program of subsidized low-cost housing has been undertaken to serve
a variety of state interests. Should an eligible tenant be wrongfully evicted,
some frustration of these interests will result. The impact on the tenant is no
less. Not only is he, by definition, one of a class who cannot afford acceptable
housing so that he is 'condemned to suffer a grievous loss,' but should it be
subsequently determined that his eviction was improper the wrong cannot be
speedily made right because of the demand for low-cost public housing and the
likelihood that the space from which he was evicted will be occupied by others.
In short, both governmental and individual interests are furthered by affording
due process in the eviction process."
The Caulder analysis, like that in Goldberg, indicates that the
balance is not between purely private interests and state interests. In
fact, in all cases involving the termination of state assistance, whether
in the form of welfare payments or low cost housing, there can be little
doubt that some governmental interest in continuing the benefit to an
eligible recipient will always exist.
In cases like Goldberg, Escalera, and Caulder, fiscal considera-
tions, while relevant, are seldom decisive.' s In Crow v. California
Department of Human Resources,6 for example, in denying the ter-
mination of unemployment insurance 7 without providing the individ-
ual the benefit of an eligibility hearing, the district court reasoned that
there are ways by which the state can protect itself or rely on recoup-
ment measures which have already been found constitutional.'8
While the lower courts were cautiously extending the pre-
termination hearing to cases involving public housing, unemployment
14. Id. at 1003 (footnote omitted).
15. Crow v. Department of Human Res., 325 F. Supp. 1314, 1317 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
16. 325 F. Supp. 1314 (N.D. Cal. 1970). See also Java v. Department of Human Res., 317
F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Cal. 1970), affd on different grounds, 402 U.S. 121 (197 1).
17. While recognizing that the unemployment compensation insurance program was not
based on need in the sense underlying various welfare programs, the Supreme Court noted that
there is a kind of "need" present to require due process protection for the benefits just as in
Goldberg. Department of Human Res. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 130-32, 135-36 (1970). See also
Wright v. Finch, 321 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1971) (disability insurance).
18. 325 F. Supp. at 1317. The court noted that California, for example, provides that an
individual who is found to have refused suitable employment in a given week, could after a fair
hearing, forfeit his right to payment of unemployment insurance for as many as nine successive
weeks. Id.
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insurance, and disability payments,19 the Supreme Court took a giant
step forward this past year when it held in Bell v. Burson2 1 that the
due process clause mandated a hearing prior to the suspension of the
motor vehicle registration and driver's license of an uninsured motor-
ist under the Georgia Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. 2' The
Act provides for the suspension of an uninsured motorist's license
where he is involved in an accident and fails to post security to cover
the amount of damages claimed by the aggrieved parties, 22 but makes
no provision for the determination of fault prior to the suspension.2 3
The petitioner, a Georgia clergyman whose ministry required him to
travel by car through rural Georgia, argued that the accident in which
he was involved was unavoidable 24 and the suspension without a find-
ing of fault was unconstitutional. The state contended that the unin-
sured motorist's interest in avoiding the suspension of his license was
outweighed by countervailing government interests which included the
protection of a claimant from the possibility of an unrecoverable
judgment and the administrative expense of such a hearing. In strik-
ing the balance in favor of the individual, the Court stated that
"[o]nce licenses are issued, as in the petitioner's case, their continued
possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Sus-
pension of issued licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates
important interests of the licensees. 12 5 In rejecting the state's argu-
ment that it need not provide a hearing on liability because fault was
irrelevant to its statutory scheme, the Court noted that if prior to the
suspension there had been a release from liability executed by the
injured party, or there had been an adjudication of nonliability, no
19. Wright v. Finch, 321 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1971). The Supreme Court, in a per curiam
opinion, decided to withhold judicial action on the appeal pending reprocessing under new
regulations issued by the Department of HEW. Richardson v. Wright, 40 U.S.L.W. 4232 (U.S.
Feb. 24, 1972) (Nos. 70-161, 70-5211).
20. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
21. GA. CODE ANN. § 92A-601 etseq. (1958).
22. Id. § 92A-605(a).
23. 402 U.S. at 536.
24. Petitioner was actually found to be free from fault in a hearing pursuant to a statutory
right to appeal de novo, GA. CODE ANN. § 92A-602 (1958), and the Georgia Superior Court
ordered that the license not be suspended until there was an actual suit filed against the petitioner
to recover damages for the injuries sustained. The order was reversed by the Georgia Court of
Appeals. 402 U.S. at 538.
25. 402 U.S. at 539. See generally Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare, supra note
3, at 1255; Reich, The New Property, supra note 3.
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suspension would have been worked under the Act;"8 and, thus, the
state could not, consistent with due process, eliminate consideration
of the fault factor prior to suspension. The Court reasoned that where
there is no reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against
the faultless licensee, it is impossible for state interests to outweigh
those of the individual. 27
After Bell it would appear that only in rare instances could the
government side of the balance offset the private-interest side to elimi-
nate the need for a prior hearing, since the injury suffered by a poten-
tially eligible benefit recipient need only be as great as the loss of one's
driver's license. However, in Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc.,2" the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Federal Housing
Administration approval of across-the-board rent increases of a feder-
ally subsidized project, made pursuant to a standard regulatory agree-
ment and without a hearing, does not violate the tenant's fifth amend-
ment right to due process. Organized in 1963 as a New York limited
dividends corporation 29 for the construction of a section 221(d)(3)"
housing complex, Chenango Court had been financially unsuccessful
from its inception. In 1970 it defaulted on payments due under the
terms of its below-market interest mortgage and on certain real estate
taxes. The United States instituted a foreclosure action which was
stayed by stipulation pending an FHA investigation of Chenango's
financial affairs. To bolster its financial position Chenango Court
sought to increase its rents. However, before such a measure could be
initiated Chenango was required, under the standard regulatory agree-
ment it had entered into with the FHA ' to file an application for
26. 402 U.S. at 54 1.
27. Although not touched upon by the Court, one possible factor in tipping the scale in favor
of the licensee is that the suspension of one's license has always had penal connotations since it
is often used as a punishment for violation of state motor vehicle laws. Whether this factor will
be used to narrow the holding in Bell is not yet apparent.
28. 447 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1971).
29. N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW §§ 70 et seq. (McKinney 1962).
30. National Housing Act § 221(d)(3), 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(3) (1970),formnerly 68 Stat.
599 (1954). The section 221(d)(3) program aids private industry in providing low and moderate
income housing by issuing insurance on long term mortgage loans covering up to 90 percent of
the project's cost and providing below-market interest rates to eligible borrowers on FHA-
insured loans.
31. The regulatory agreement provided:
No increase will be made in the amount of the gross monthly dwelling income for
all units as shown on the rental schedule unless such increase is approved by the Commis-
sioner, who will at any time entertain a written request for an increase properly supported
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approval. The FHA approved the higher rents conditioned on the
maintenance of services at current levels and subject to reductions at
any time at the FHA's sole discretion. Many tenants refused to pay
the new rents and at a meeting with regional FHA officials sought
all of the information upon which the approval was based as well as
an opportunity to present opposing material. The FHA denied the
tenants any form of a hearing and Chenango Court instituted suit in
New York courts for the rents due or the eviction of delinquent ten-
ants. The tenants countered by filing this action seeking a temporary
injunction preventing the increases and evictions, a declaration that
the FHA approval without a prior hearing violated the due process
clause of the fifth amendment, and an injunction against further in-
creases except after an adjudication in accordance with the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act.3 2 The district court dismissed the tenants' ac-
tion for lack of jurisdiction 33 and the Second Circuit affirmed, reach-
ing the merits in a 2 to 1 decision.
With the passage of the Housing Act of 1949,'3 Congress officially
adopted a national housing policy aimed at eliminating substandard
housing and achieving "a decent home and a suitable living environ-
ment for every American family."35 One method of attaining this
objective is the use of section 221(d)(3),3 1 a provision "designed to
assist private industry in providing housing for low and moderate
income families and displaced families"37 with FHA mortgage insur-
ance 38 and below-market interest rates.39 To administer the 221 (d)(3)
program, Congress conferred broad discretion on the Secretary of
H U D, authorizing him to approve mortgagors and to supervise their
operations "under a regulatory agreement or otherwise, as to rents,
charges, and methods of operation, in such form and in such manner
by substantiating evidence and within a reasonable time shall: (1) Approve a rental
schedule that is necessary to compensate for any net increase, occurring since the last
approved rental schedule, in taxes (other than income taxes) and operating and mainte-
nance expenses over which owners have no effective control, or (2) Deny the increase
stating the reasons therefor. 447 F.2d at 298.
32. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556 (1970).
33. Unreported decision, referred to in 447 F.2d at 299.
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401 etseq. (1970).
35. Id. § 1441(a).
36. 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(3) (1970).
37. Id. § 17 151(a) (emphasis added).
38. Id. § 17151 (b).
39. Id. § 17151(d)(5).
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as in the opinion of the Secretary will effectuate the purposes of this
section."40 As a result of this legislative mandate HUD has promul-
gated various regulations controlling 221(d)(3) projects," one of
which requires that applications for rent increases be submitted to the
FHA for approval based on the rental income necessary to maintain
a project's economic soundness and "to provide a reasonable return
on the investment consistent with providing reasonable rentals to ten-
ants."4 Section 221(d)(3), however, unlike other provisions of the
Housing Acts,4 3 does not specifically provide for a hearing.
Even in the absence of a specific statutory mandate, the courts
have generally required an agency to grant a hearing where the admin-
istrative determination involved "adjudicative" rather than "legisla-
tive" facts. 44 The distinction between these two types of facts was
clearly drawn by the Fifth Circuit in Hornsby v. Allen,45 a case in
which the petitioner was denied a liquor license without a hearing. The
Hornsby court viewed the denial of a license as an adjudication that
the applicant had not satisfied the established qualifications and re-
quirements. 46 Since licensing was found to be adjudicative in nature,
the court held the fundamental requirements of due process applica-
ble, which necessitated a fair hearing. 47
In a case very similar to Chenango Court, Hahn v. Gottlieb," the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied tenants a right to a
40. Id. § 17151(d)(3).
41. 24 C.F.R. §§ 221.502etseq. (1971).
42. Id. § 221.531(c) (1971).
43. See, e.g., HOUSING AcT OF 1949 § 105(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (1970), requiring a
public hearing before aid is granted to an urban renewal project.
44. See, e.g., The Assigned Car Cases, 274 U.S. 564 (1927); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d
605 (5th Cir. 1964); State Bd. of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co., 179 A. 116 (N.J. Eq. 1935).
Professor Davis defines adjudicative facts as those "pertaining to the parties and their
businesses and activities." I DAvis § 7.02. General facts which do not concern the immediate
parties and which help the tribunal decide questions of law, policy and discretion are termed
legislative. It is considered impractical to let everyone have a voice in a legislative determination
since many of the parties affected have little or nothing to contribute to the development of
legislative facts. On the other hand, interested parties, knowing more about the facts concerning
themselves and their activities than anyone else is likely to know, are in the best position to
rebut or explain evidence that bears upon adjudicative facts. Id.
45. 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
46. Id. at 608. On the other hand, the court noted that the prescription of the standards for
obtaining a license was legislative since it created authoritative guidelines for future conduct
derived from an assessment of the community needs. Id.
47. Id. See Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941).
48. 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir. 1970), noted in 1970 Duke Project 312.
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hearing, finding the approval of rent increases made on all the apart-
ment units in a section 221(d)(3) housing project to be an informal
rate-making process and therefore legislative in nature. 9 The court
noted that when such an agency decision turns on legislative facts, a
formal hearing will contribute little to the agency's understanding of
the issues.50 The Hahn court distinguished the proceedings in Escalera
and Goldberg as being adjudicative since they involved only individ-
ual recipients of state assistance. Furthermore, the court fourid an-
other significant difference between the Hahn proceedings and the
Goldberg and Escalera cases. In the latter, the interest of the individ-
ual was directly jeopardized when the agency decided to terminate the
welfare benefits, or to approve eviction. In Hahn, however, under the
National Housing Act the primary role of the FHA is that of an
insurer for private investors so that the government does not provide
the assistance directly under the section 221 (d)(3) program.51 Thus the
government action in Hahn poses a less serious threat than in
Goldberg and Escalera and requires a less compelling government
interest to balance that of the individual. Applying what it termed the
"constitutionally relevant test,"52 the Hahn court held that a hearing
was not constitutionally necessary and noted that if such a require-
ment existed it might frustrate the government endorsed program by
delaying economically necessary rent increases and discouraging pri-
vate investors from entering the section 221 (d)(3) program. 53
Faced with essentially the same situation that appeared in Hahn,
the court in Chenango Court reached a similar conclusion but with a
different rationale. After handling the jurisdictional question which
troubled the district court 4 and noting that no statutory requirement
for a hearing existed, 5 the court dealt with the more difficult question
49. 430 F.2d at 1248.
50. Id. at 1248-49.
51. Id. at 1247.
52. Id. at 1249. The test consisted of weighing the government interest in a summary
procedure for approving rent increases against the tenants' interest in greater procedural safe-
guards.
53. Id. at 1248.
54. See note 33 supra and accompanying text. The circuit court found that the plaintiff's
claim of entitlement to a hearing before the FHA did not require a jurisdictional amount under
28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970), because it was an "action in the nature of mandamus to compel an
officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to
plaintiff." 447 F.2d at 300.
55. The Administrative Procedure Act requires a hearing in cases of "adjudication required
by statute to be determined on the record after an opportunity for agency hearing." 5 U.S.C.
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of due process. Contrary to the finding in Hahn, the Second Circuit
categorized the approval of rent increases as an adjudicative rather
than a legislative proceeding, refusing to rely on the easy but uncon-
vincing adjudicative versus legislative facts distinction. While recog-
nizing that adjudicative action by an agency usually entitles a citizen
to a hearing, the court attempted to draw a distinction between an
agency making the adjudicative decision and an agency merely
approving the decision already made by a private individual." In
other words, "the Government did not itself increase the rents but
simply allowed the landlord to institute an increase upon the termina-
tion of existing tenancies, as the landlord would have been legally free
to do but for its regulatory agreement with the FHA."57 While recog-
nizing that the National Housing Act contemplated, regulatory con-
trol of section 221(d)(3) projects, the court did not consider the
FHA's determination a "full fledged public utility rate proceeding""
nor an agency action equivalent to the ones found in Escalera or
Goldberg.59 The court's overriding consideration in holding that due
process did not require a hearing before the approval of section
221(d)(3) rent increases, however, was the fear that such a hearing
would discourage private investors from constructing such housing or
otherwise frustrate the program." As pointed out in the court's opin-
ion, Congress clearly chose to give the FHA as much flexibility as
possible to achieve a sufficient supply of homes for low and moderate
income and displaced families.
In their attempt to foster the congressional objective of encourag-
ing private enterprise to undertake the construction of 221 (d)(3) hous-
ing, the Second Circuit strained to draw a distinction between the
agency action in Chenango Court and that in Goldberg and Escalera.
§ 554 (1970). The court read section 221(d)(3) of the National Housing Act as leaving the
procedure to be used open to the Secretary's discretion. 447 F.2d at 300.
56. Id. at 300-01.
57. Id. at 301.
58. Id.
59. Judge Oakes, dissenting, believed that the majority drew a "distinction without a differ-
ence." He argued that a tenant in a 221 (d)(3) project should stand in no worse shoes than tenants
in a city housing project such as Escalera. The mere fact that the government itself did not
increase the rents but rather permitted the landlord to institute the increase was in his opinion
indistinguishable. Id. at 304.
60. "This danger is rather vividly illustrated in the instant case where long postponement
of rent increases would doubtless have led to mortgage foreclosure and evictions by a pur-
chaser." Id. at 301 n. 9.
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In light of recent decisions6 it is questionable whether a difference
remains between government action and a private, but regulated, in-
dividual or group. This would be especially true in Chenango Court,
as well as Hahn, where the FHA regulations expressly require an
agency determination before approval of a rent increase, and, there-
fore, call for affirmative action by the FHA.62 The better reasoning,
which the Second Circuit appeared to follow without really articulat-
ing, is the use of the balancing test which appears in Hahn, Esialera,
Goldberg and Bell. The fact that Hahn viewed the FHA's determina-
tion as legislative while Chenango Court viewed a similar proceeding
as adjudicative made little difference in their final decisions. Once
Chenango Court classified the facts as adjudicative it then weighed
the competing interests of the parties involved. This indicates the
limitation of the adjudicative-legislative distinction and suggests
that the ultimate test to be used is that of balancing the interests. The
determination of the nature of the facts relied on in the agency pro-
ceeding thus becomes only a short cut to weighing the interests.
Of greater significance is the insight that Chenango Court gives
into the interests to be balanced and the weights to be given in apply-
ing the balancing test prescribed in Goldberg. Since cases such as
Escalera and Caulder make it clear that private concern in continuing
tenancies in public housing is of sufficient magnitude to require a
hearing when balanced against the government's administrative and
fiscal interest, it is important to understand the true distinction in
Chenango Court. As noted in the dissent, there is little difference
between the hardship of being evicted for violation of project rules and
being forced out because of the inability to meet the higher rents; and
after Bell it is clear that the courts will not require an overwhelming
private interest to tip the scale when set off against solely administra-
tive and fiscal considerations. The difference in Chenango Court,
therefore, is that on the government side of the balance also exists the
interests of private landlords with whom government has left the
responsibility to carry out the operation of the section 221(d)(3) pro-
gram. This added factor, which has been recognized on several
occasions, is enough to offset a very compelling private concern.
61. Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970), noted in 1970 Duke Project 200. See also
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 462
(1952).
62. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
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Thus, in the line of cases which has followed Goldberg, two 1971
decisions have been helpful in shedding some light on the inherent
problems of applying a balancing test. In Bell the Supreme Court has
indicated that where the government has issued a benefit to an individ-
ual, whatever that benefit may be, it will take more than administra-
tive and fiscal considerations to suspend or terminate that benefit
without a prior hearing. In Chenango Court the Second Circuit illus-
trated that the addition of some other private interest to the state's
fiscal and administrative side of the balance can be sufficient to offset
the individual's interest in maintaining his state assistance and in such
case no pre-termination hearing will be required.
B. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS ACCOMPANYING THE RIGHT TO A
HEARING: A PUBLIC "TRIAL"
Most of the cases following Goldberg v. Kelly' have dealt only
with the constitutional right to a hearing and not with the procedural
safeguards which might accompany that hearing, such as a right to
oral argument, presentation of witnesses, or cross-examination of
witnesses. Fitzgerald v. Hampton2 illustrates an increasing effort to
extend Goldberg to require such procedural safeguards. 3 In Fitz-
gerald the District Court for the District of Columbia held that a
dismissed federal employee had a constitutional right to a public dis-
missal hearing. While holding the position of Deputy for Manage-
ment Systems of the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, the
employee had revealed, in highly publicized testimony before the
Joint Economic Committee, a high cost overrun on the Air Force
contract for the C5A transport aircraft.4 The employee, a preference
1. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See pp. 158-59 supra.
2. _ F. Supp. - (D.D.C. 1971).
3. See, e.g., Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v. American Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935, 940-43
(1971). For a listing of pending cases involving this issue, see Richardson v. Wright, - U.S.
, ____n.l, reprinted at, 40 U.S.L.W. 4232, 4233 n.l (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972) (Nos. 70-161 &
70-5211).
4. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic
Committee, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2589-96 (1968).
5. See Brief for Appellant at 3, Fitzgerald v. Hampton, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1971). The
statutory definition of "preference eligible" is found in 5 U.S.C. § 3501(a)(3) (1970). These
employees are granted a somewhat favored status. Even in reduction-in-force situations, the
Civil Service Commission is directed to "give due effect to" an employee's preference eligible
status. Id. § 3502(a)(2).
[Vol. 1972:115
